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Liquidity, Technological Opportunities,
and the Stage Distribution of Venture
Capital Investments
Henry Lahr and Andrea Mina∗
This paper explores the determinants of the stage distribution of European venture capital in-
vestments from 1990 to 2011. Consistent with liquidity risk theory, we find that the likelihood
of investing in earlier stages increases relative to all private equity investments during liquidity
crisis years. While liquidity is the main driver of acquisition investments and, to some extent, of
expansion financings, technological opportunities are overall the main driver of early and late
stage venture capital investments. In contrast to the dotcom crash, the recent financial crisis
negatively affected the relative likelihood of expansion investments, but not of early and late stage
investments.
Venture capital (VC) is an effective market-based solution for investment in high risk and
opaque projects as it combines financial resources with specific screening, monitoring, and
certification skills (Chan, 1983; Sahlman, 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Lerner, 1995;
Hellman, 1998; Kaplan and Stro¨mberg, 2001; Ueda, 2004; Caselli, Gatti, and Perrini, 2009) and
with substantive knowledge of markets and technologies (Cohen and Levin, 1989; Kortum and
Lerner, 2000; Cornelli and Yosha, 2003; Denis, 2004).1 Capital flows in this market, however,
have displayed sensitivity to past performance and cyclical patterns over time (Gompers and
Lerner, 2000; Kaplan and Schoar, 2005). Furthermore, turmoil in international financial markets
can affect the demand and supply of VC, alter the routes of capital flows across nations and
financial intermediaries, and change allocation decisions between asset classes. Having shaken
the foundations of the global financial system, the recent crisis has tested the resilience of VC
markets and raised questions about their reliability as a funding mechanism.2
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1 We define private equity as independently managed, dedicated pools of capital focused on equity or equity-linked
investments in privately held companies. We use the term private equity in a broad sense to include VC funds, as well as
buyout, turnaround, and mezzanine funds. VC funds are defined as those funds that invest in firms at the seed, early, or
later stage of the firm’s development. For a more detailed definition, see the description of Table I.
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From a theoretical viewpoint, the crisis provides an excellent opportunity to revisit and further
develop theories that explain the role of exits in VC contracting (Black and Gilson, 1998;
Aghion, Bolton, and Tirole, 2004) and predict the stage distribution of private equity investments
(Gompers, 1995; Cumming, Fleming, and Schwienbacher, 2005, 2009). Liquidity risk theory
posits that investors face a trade off between liquidity risk and technological risk, and are more
likely to invest in earlier stages in times of liquidity crises. Large time series variations in
the market for new equity issues induced by the financial crisis allow us to disentangle the
liquidity explanation for the stage distribution of investments from competing hypotheses derived
from other macroeconomic factors. In particular, by incorporating insights from the economics
of innovation, we uncover the role of technological opportunities in driving investment stage
choices. From an empirical viewpoint, the crisis calls for an in-depth analysis of the long-term
development patterns of the sector to deepen our understanding of its challenges and future
prospects (Kedrosky, 2009; Mason, 2009; Lerner, 2011).
In this paper, we are interested in structural changes in the stage distribution of investments.
We investigate the relative importance of exit channel liquidity in private equity investments at
different stages of a firm’s development. Our analysis focuses on the time variation in investors’
choices of early versus late stage investments in relation to the broadermacroeconomic framework
and identifies the drivers of investment stage distribution. We posit that investors’ choices will
be sensitive to liquidity risk and the availability of technological opportunities. We expect to
find different effects depending on market conditions and across investment stages. We test the
explanatory power of liquidity and technological opportunities as drivers of the stage distribution
of private equity investments. In our empirical analyses, we use information on 35,240 European
private equity investments in the period 1990-2011, extracted from Thomson Reuters’ private
equity database, which we augment with macroeconomic indicators from Eurostat and other
sources. A focus on investments, as opposed to fundraising activities or fund returns, addresses
the link between financial intermediaries and the real economy.
Consistent with liquidity risk theory, our results demonstrate a greater likelihood of investing
in earlier stages relative to all private equity investments during crisis years. However, liquidity
risk theory cannot explain the decreasing likelihood of late stage investments in liquid markets,
which we find after controlling for deal characteristics and other environmental variables. While
liquidity seems to be the main driver of acquisition investments and, to some extent, of expan-
sion financings, technological opportunities are the most powerful explanation of earlier stage
investment choices. Firms’ expenditures for research and development explain about half of the
added log-likelihood in models for early and late stage investments when compared to full models
including time dummies. Results indicating relatively weaker explanatory power for liquidity risk
are supported by direct comparisons of the proportions of early and late stage investments in
periods before and after the financial crisis and the dotcom crash.
This analysis responds to the need for a better understanding of long-term regularities in the
stage allocation of VC. It also allows us to look at the specific effects of the financial crisis on VC-
backed entrepreneurial processes, whose earlier stages may be especially resource constrained,
and to verify which types of investments have been most affected and in what way. Overall, our
results document a decreasing number of investments after 2003, but a reverse trend for early
and late stage VC investments during the recent crisis. The crisis’ effect on seed investments
is, however, negative after controlling for deal characteristics and macroeconomic variables. We
argue that the positive residual effect of the crisis on late stage investments, which is at odds with
precrisis volume. Similarly, investments into European target firms plunged to levels last seen after the Internet bubble
burst around the year 2001.
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the liquidity risk hypothesis, can be interpreted as an indication that investors are trying to keep
portfolio companies afloat while waiting for exit markets to recover.
In summary, our paper contributes to the literature on the driving forces behind VC investments
by testing the liquidity risk hypothesis and integrating the effect of technological opportunities and
other key macroeconomic indicators. While Black and Gilson (1998) argue for the theoretical
importance of exit opportunities to solve governance problems in VC, Gompers et al. (2008)
empirically confirm the positive relationship between public market valuations and liquidity
signals and total VC investments, but do not distinguish investments by stage. This is done
by Cumming et al. (2005), who find relatively more early stage investments than late stage
investments in times of illiquid exit markets. A later paper by Cumming et al. (2009) reveals
a different pattern in investors’ behavior. Funds shift their stage focus from early stage to later
stages in a falling market. Our study examines and extends these results in the light of the
financial crisis as a liquidity crisis. While prior studies posit theoretical differences between
early stage and late stage VC, we find that these two stage classes behave similarly with respect
to exit channel liquidity, but rather differently from other private equity stages (i.e., expansion
and acquisition). By considering the full range of private equity stages, we answer the question
as to which stages are most affected by liquidity that was left open by Gompers et al. (2008).
We develop Gompers and Lerner’s (1999) suggestion that VC accumulates in regions with high
industrial and academic research and development (R&D) expenditures, and uncover strong and
positive effects of technological opportunities on VC investments. Finally, we integrate into our
analytical setting the sensitivity of investment stage choices to macroeconomic uncertainty and
credit market conditions.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we present the relevant theoretical
background and derive testable hypotheses. Section II contains data sources, variables, and
methods of analysis. In Section III, we present univariate statistics on the long run trends of
European VC markets. Section IV provides our main results, which are further discussed in
Section V in relation to the financial crisis. Section VI extends our analysis to consider the role
of country-specific effects. We conclude by summarizing the main contributions of the paper and
by reflecting on the long-term challenges of the VC investment model.
I. Theory and Hypotheses
Themarket climate for initial public offerings (IPOs) is often cited, theoretically and empirically,
as the main determinant of VC investments (Black and Gilson, 1998; Gompers et al., 2008). The
profitability of initial investments relies on successful exits to distribute the proceeds to the fund’s
investors before the end of the fund’s lifetime, typically within ten years. The expectation is that
during periods of narrow IPO markets, we will observe fewer late stage deals as these rely on the
possibility of floating the portfolio firm within a short time after the investment. For seed and
early stage investments, exit channels can be equally important, although there is a recent trend
toward longer holding periods that sometimes exceed the fund’s lifetime.3
In a study of liquidity risk in VC markets, Cumming et al. (2005) theorize that in times of
actual or anticipated illiquidity, venture capitalists invest relatively more often in early stage
deals in order to exit much further in the future. They argue that fund managers trade off this
exit risk for technological risk by investing in less mature businesses that will take longer to
generate profits through successful exits. These investments are realized when markets become
3 IPO valuations appear to have a positive effect primarily on the volume of new funds raised by private equity firms
(Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Jeng and Wells, 2000) and especially by younger firms (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005).
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more liquid and favorable to IPOs. When this happens, private equity funds target late stage
investments that require little time for a profitable exit, thus reducing the proportion of early
stage deals. Therefore, we would expect to see more early stage investments and fewer late stage
deals in market downturns and illiquid periods.
The financial crisis exposed capital markets to a severe liquidity shock. After a substantial drop
in 2009, European VC exit volume declined further in 2010. Data from the European Private
Equity and Venture Capital Association indicate that while buyout exit volume (but not numbers)
recovered from the crisis, VC exits remain flat since 2008, with many investments still being
written off. The exit channel via IPO remains narrow, with only 22 European venture-backed
companies going public in 2010, 18 in 2011, and 8 in 2012 (EVCA, 2012, 2013). This underscores
the difficulties faced by VC funds when they take firms public instead of pursuing other more
indirect exit routes. Econometrically, the high volatility in IPOmarkets and other macroeconomic
variables offers an opportunity to obtain precise estimates of the effects on the otherwise slowly
moving distribution of VC investments.
A time-varying stage distribution of investments can also be explained by changing investment
styles. Changing market conditions may cause fund managers’ preferences for early or late
stage investments to drift away from the stage focus stated in the fund’s partnership agreements.
Cumming et al. (2009) investigate this stage drift and report statistically and economically
significant effects of market conditions on the likelihood that a fund makes investments in firms
at a stage of development that is inconsistent with the fund’s stated stage preference at the time of
its inception. Positive NASDAQ returns reduce the likelihood of stage drift in early stage funds
suggesting that private equity firms try to reap the benefits of long-term investments that can be
profitably sold by taking portfolio firms public. Similarly, the stage focus of late stage funds is
more likely to drift into early stage in a positive market climate. Applied to periods of negative
market returns and assuming that the composition of active private equity funds is stable, their
results imply a smaller number of early stage investments and an increase in late stage deals.
We sum these liquidity effects to formulate the following hypotheses:
H1: A liquidity crisis increases the likelihood of seed and early stage investments.
H2: A liquidity crisis decreases the likelihood of late stage investments.
The likelihood of exit is, however, not the only factor affecting VC investment decisions,
despite the central role it plays in a liquidity risk framework as developed by Cumming et al.
(2005). VC investments are sensitive to stock market demand for new firms, but also respond
to the availability of technological opportunities. Without underestimating the complexities of
technical change (Kline and Rosenberg, 1986), historians of technology have long argued that
entrepreneurial developments significantly depend upon scientific and technological progress
(Rosenberg, 1974). Schumpeterian economics has demonstrated the fundamental importance
of innovation for the growth of firms, industries, and national economies (Schumpeter, 1934;
Nelson and Winter, 1982; Fagerberg, Mowery, and Nelson, 2005) and new growth theories have
successfully incorporated the accumulation of knowledge into modern macroeconomic modeling
(Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1992).
Technological opportunities can be loosely defined as “the likelihood of innovating” (Breschi,
Malerba, and Orsenigo, 2000) or more precisely defined within a standard neoclassical theory
of production as “the set of production possibilities for translating research resources into new
techniques of production that employ conventional inputs” (Cohen, 2010). The magnitude of
technological opportunities depends upon the nature of technological fields, their evolution
over time, and their closeness to basic science (Nelson and Winter, 1982). From an aggregate
viewpoint, the richer the stock of ideas circulating in the economy, the greater the probability of
Lahr & Mina  Determinants of the Stage Distribution of Venture Capital Investments 295
new combinations of intangible inputs, their translation into production, and, ultimately, higher
growth rates (Weitzman, 1998; Olsson, 2005). New knowledge opens up fresh opportunities for
profit. These opportunities, which are highest at the early stages of industry or market segment
development, require selective investments for the commercial exploitation of valuable ideas
(Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). This is where VC can intervene to realize the potential value
of new ideas, enable new firm creation, and de-risk entrepreneurial initiatives.
In the VC literature, Gompers and Lerner (1999) find that VC tends to accumulate in regions
with high industrial and academic R&D expenditures.More recent data fromEurostat suggest that
businesses in Europe reduced or even stopped their R&D projects in the aftermath of the dotcom
bubble leading to a decrease in aggregate R&D spending as a percentage of gross domestic
product (GDP) until 2005 when the trend reversed.4 The prospects for early stage investments
during the financial crisis lookmore favorable from anR&Dpoint of view.R&Dexpenditures rose
beyond the peak reached at the height of the dotcom boom. Given the importance of technological
opportunities in the early stages of new company development, we conjecture that:
H3: The effect of technological opportunities on the likelihood of seed and early stage invest-
ments is stronger than the effect of exit opportunities.
H4: The effect of technological opportunities on the likelihood of late stage investments is
weaker than the effect of exit opportunities.
II. Data Sources and Methodology
A. Investment Data and Deal Variables
For our analyses of investment stages, we extract a set of 37,821 investment transactions from
1990 to 2012 from Thomson Reuters’ private equity database (formerly VentureXpert). Since
at the time of writing, R&D data are available only until 2011, our multivariate analyses are
limited to 35,240 investments. Transaction data cover all European countries in which at least one
private equity investment is observed within the period of study. For our multivariate analysis,
we include countries with at least 100 investments.5 We include all stages of firm development
(see Table I for stage definitions) except “VC partnership,” as private equity funds investing in
other private equity funds are beyond the scope of this paper. Following a similar rationale, we
exclude financial firms as targets. In order to make meaningful comparisons over time and across
countries, we adjust individual deal sizes (i.e., amount invested) for inflation and translate these
values into euros according to the 2010 purchasing power parity exchange rate. Exchange rates
and GDP deflators are obtained from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic
Outlook Database April 2013.
The portfolio company and deal-specific variables we use in our analyses include the target
firm’s geographical location (nation), industry, firm age at investment, type of capital provided
(equity, debt, or both), and the number of investors. Industries are coded according to the 10 US
Standard Industry Classification (SIC) 1987 divisions. An overview of the sample composition
can be found in Table I. Because of the highly skewed age distribution, we use the logarithm of
firm age in days at the investment and the logarithm of deal size in all our analyses. The mean
4 Total R&D expenditure (GERD) in the European Union (27). Time series (code: rd_e_gerdtot) are available from
Eurostat at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database.
5 The final list contains Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
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Table I. Summary Statistics for Key Variables
This table presents descriptive statistics for the main variables used in this paper. Age is measured as firm
age in (log) days at investment. Deal size (log) is adjusted for inflation using the local GDP deflator and
converted to EUR based on 2010 purchasing power parity exchange rates (source for GDP and PPP data:
IMF World Economic Outlook 2013). Investors is the (log) number of investors in a transaction. IPOs
Europe is the (log) number of European firms going public in the calendar year in which the investment
is made. R&D/GDP is aggregate R&D spending for EU27 countries by GDP in percentage points, VIX
is the CBOE volatility index divided by 100, ESI is the European Economic Sentiment Indicator divided
by 100, UK Credit Spread is the yield spread between 10-year UK gilts and UK 10-year corporate bonds
from Datastream, and UK Gov. Yield is the yield on 10-year UK gilts, both in percentage points. Stage
definitions are as follows: Seed Stage is the investments in portfolio companies that have not yet fully
established commercial operations. These may also involve funding for research and product development.
Early Stage is the provision of finance for product development and initial marketing, manufacturing, and
sales activities. Later Stage involves firms that have an established product or service, which may not be
making a profit yet. Late stage rounds include the last round of investments in portfolio companies before an
exit by an IPO or trade sale is made. This category includes bridge loans. Expansion includes investments by
both buyout firms and venture capital firms. For venture capital firms, expansion investments in firms with
established products and services are used to expand production and increase revenue. For buyout firms, these
investments are sometimes referred to as growth investments. The objective of these investments is to expand
operations nationally or internationally by increased production or through acquisitions of smaller or similarly
sized firms. Acquisition includes transactions used to obtain control of a private portfolio company, such
as a leveraged buyout (LBO), management buyout (MBO), management buy-in (MBI), mezzanine capital,
secondary buyout, or an acquisition for expansion. Other: This category includes public market investments
(open market purchases or PIPEs—a private placement of equity by companies that are already trading on
the public market), recap transactions, turnaround investments and secondary purchases.
N Mean Median SD Min Max % Missing
Panel A. Deal Characteristics
Age (log) 35,240 7.806 7.819 1.441 0.000 11.450 23.1
Deal Size (log) 35,240 0.875 0.932 1.918 –8.696 8.634 33.0
Investors (log) 35,240 0.343 0.000 0.517 0.000 3.091 0.0
Capital Type Equity 46.4% Equity & Debt 1.8%
Debt 2.4% Missing 49.2%
Stage Seed 9.6% Later Stage 6.1% Acquisition 31.5%
Early Stage 14.5% Expansion 33.9% Other 2.2%
Industry Construction 1.4% Retail trade 3.7% Missing 22.7%
Infrastructure 6.3% Services 30.8%
Manufacturing 31.6% Wholesale trade 3.4%
Country Austria 1.4% Hungary 0.6% Romania 0.4%
Belgium 2.5% Ireland 2.4% Spain 4.4%
Czech Republic 0.5% Italy 2.9% Sweden 6.7%
Denmark 3.2% Netherlands 4.9% Switzerland 2.4%
Finland 4.1% Norway 2.1% United Kingdom 27.6%
France 19.0% Poland 1.4%
Germany 12.4% Portugal 1.1%
Year 1990 0.3% 1996 1.5% 2002 5.0% 2008 6.2%
1991 0.3% 1997 1.3% 2003 9.2% 2009 4.2%
1992 0.4% 1998 2.5% 2004 9.9% 2010 5.6%
1993 0.5% 1999 4.5% 2005 8.8% 2011 6.9%
1994 0.6% 2000 9.5% 2006 7.3%
1995 0.8% 2001 8.1% 2007 6.5%
(Continued)
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Table I. Summary Statistics for Key Variables (Continued)
N Mean Median SD Min Max % Missing
Panel B. Macroeconomic Indicators
IPOs Europe 35,240 5.912 5.900 0.588 3.912 6.834 0.0
R&D/GDP 35,240 1.193 1.190 0.038 1.093 1.270 0.0
VIX 35,240 0.214 0.225 0.060 0.124 0.327 0.0
ESI 35,240 1.020 1.026 0.078 0.793 1.145 0.0
UK Credit Spread 35,240 1.340 1.129 0.956 0.368 4.382 0.0
UK Gov. Yield 35,240 4.784 4.883 1.056 3.121 11.803 0.0
(log) age is 7.8 days (approx. 6.7 years), while without taking logs, mean age is 16 years. The
median deal size is EUR 2.6 million, but its average is EUR 17 million. The average investment
has 1.7 investors. A large majority of investments are made in the form of equity, and only a tiny
minority involve the provision of debt or a mix of equity and debt.
An important consideration in our analysis is the representativeness of our sample. The data
obtained from Thomson ONEmay contain errors or biases toward late stage deals that might skew
our results. Kaplan, Sensoy, and Stro¨mberg (2002) and Maats et al. (2008) provide comparisons
and discussions of the most popular data sets. Kaplan et al. (2002) report that about 15%
of investments made from 1986 to 1999 are missing in Thomson ONE (Thomson Venture
Economics) and VentureSource. While both databases record financing amounts with substantial
noise, they tend to be unbiased. Thomson ONE was found to be biased toward larger, California-
focused investment rounds. Maats et al. (2008) conclude that consistency between the databases
is low, but higher on the investment level than on the fund level. Although none of these studies
provide insight into selection biases with respect to the stage of investments, nonselection of seed
or early stage deals can be a problem if rounds are too small to be recorded by ThomsonOne.
We address this risk by conducting a propensity score matching analysis of post- and precrisis
investments. Matching over a short period around event dates helps to safeguard against the risk
of sampling bias, whose impact, if at all present, should be negligible in time comparisons over
short horizons.
B. Macroeconomic Variables
Following Cumming et al. (2005), we proxy for liquidity risk by using the (log) number of
European IPOs (EU27 countries) in the year the investment is made. IPO data are obtained from
Thomson ONE. In our test of alternative indicators for liquidity risk, we use the global number
of IPOs and the global number of private equity-backed IPOs, as these should be closely related
to exit opportunities. All these liquidity proxies have one limitation: Even though they exhibit
a large time variation, they are nonstationary in principle. This may be a problem if we try to
predict a stationary variable. Ideally, we would like to use a variable that measures the global
propensity of private equity-backed firms to go public. Unfortunately, the global number of firms
with private equity backing in a given year is not known with reasonable precision. Therefore,
we scale the number of IPOs in Europe and in the world by the total number of domestic firms
listed on European or global stock exchanges, respectively, to perform a robustness check on our
main regressions.6
6 Note that in the European case, this calculation is different from taking first differences of the total number of listed
firms since European firms might list their stock on an international exchange not located in Europe.
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Operationalizing the concept of technological opportunities poses its own difficulties (Cohen,
2010). Theoretically, it could be treated as the amount of technical advance per unit of R&D and
quantified by changes in product quality, variety, and the introduction of new products or services
(Griliches, 1979). Patents or citation-weighted patent counts have been used as retrospective mea-
sures of technological opportunities (Jaffe, 1986, 1988; Trajtenberg, 1990) although patents are
themselves output, not input, of inventive efforts. Technological opportunities could be conceived
of as a latent and unobserved construct (Geroski, 1990) with several dimensions, including the
contribution of different sources of knowledge internal and external to the firm (Cohen, Levin,
and Mowery, 1987; Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). The literature presents a nuanced treatment of
the relationship between different constituent components (Cohen, 2010), but overall empirical
research has shown that most of the construct’s dimensions tend to closely correlate with R&D
expenditures (Nieto and Quevedo, 2005). Although the contribution of scientific and technolog-
ical progress to innovation varies across industries (Scherer, 1965; Klevorick et al., 1995), and
the type and efficiency of search processes may vary over time (Dosi, 1988; Olsson, 2005), R&D
expenditures are a good proxy for the aggregate volume of technological opportunities in the
context of our study also as VC is highly concentrated in R&D intensive sectors and its long run
evolution displays similar cyclical patterns. As our indicator for technological opportunities, we
use aggregate expenditures for research and development by business in the European Union (27
countries), scaled by aggregate GDP. R&D and GDP data are obtained from Eurostat.7
Since private equity investments are structured differently across stages, there is reason to
believe that changes in macroeconomic variables other than liquidity and technological opportu-
nities affect early stage investments in a different way than expansion or buyout transactions. A
tightening of credit markets, for example, will have a larger impact on debt-heavy buyout invest-
ments than on VC equity financing. To account for these effects on the stage distribution, we test
a range of indicators for economic uncertainty and credit market conditions. The attractiveness
of new investments can be affected by factors that have an impact on cash flows and capital
costs in portfolio companies. We use the annual average of the European Sentiment Indicator
(ESI) to proxy for anticipated demand conditions.8 This indicator is composed of the Industrial
confidence indicator (weight 40%), the Services confidence indicator (30%), the Consumer con-
fidence indicator (20%), and the Retail trade and Construction indicators (both 5%). The annual
European GDP growth rate can be seen as another indicator for firms’ growth potential. Due to
its high correlation with the sentiment indicator (ρ > 0.9), however, we focus our analysis on
ESI, since it also captures the forward-looking dimension of firms’ product market activities.
The CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) can also be used as an indicator of uncertainty about
firms’ prospects and stock returns as increasing volatility represents a deterioration of investment
opportunities. Implied option volatility has been tested in the literature as an investor sentiment
indicator (Baker and Wurgler, 2007) or fear gauge (Whaley, 2000). Campbell and Hentschel
(1992) estimate a model in which increases in expected excess stock returns are driven by
increasing volatility and find that this effect is concentrated in periods of high volatility. Measures
for volatility risk and investor sentiment predict stock returns in the cross-section (Ang et al.,
2006) and are negatively related to aggregate returns and stock fund flows (Simon and Wiggins,
2001; Kurov, 2010). These findings suggest that increases in stockmarket volatility raise expected
and actual stock returns, thus lowering stock prices. If firms at different stages of development
are unequally affected by changes in aggregate volatility, we expect to see a change in the stage
7 Available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database, time series code:
rd_e_gerdtot.
8 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/surveys/index_en.htm.
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distribution of investments. To test the effect of volatility on the stage distribution, we use yearly
averages calculated from daily VIX data.
Hahn and Lee (2006) argue that credit spread proxies for credit market conditions and find
that small stocks have higher loadings on credit spread than large firms. They determine that
changes in credit spread capture information contained in the Fama-French (1993) size and book-
to-market factors. We calculate credit spread as the difference between the yield of a 10-year UK
corporate bond and a 10-year UK government bond. Ideally, we would like to use an aggregate
measure for the European bond market. However, the introduction of the euro and the absence
of long time series for European corporate bonds make it impossible to calculate a credit spread
measure for European countries other than the United Kingdom. Corresponding to this choice
for credit spread, the 10-year UK government bond yield serves as a measure for the interest rate
level. Since bond yields for UK and other European bonds are highly correlated over the period
of study, we are confident that the error involved in the choice of a different regional scope is
negligible.
Table II presents the key summary statistics of our data by investment stage. As expected, it
reports that, on average, the seed and early stage involves younger firms, smaller deal sizes, and
fewer investors than the later stages. Expansion and acquisition investments (“other stages” in
the table) involve the largest deals and the lowest number of investors. These summary statistics
hint at a key hypothesis of the paper by demonstrating a higher R&D intensity for seed, early,
and late stage investments relative to the other stages. In addition, deals at the later stage occur at
relatively higher values for volatility and credit spread, and at lower values of market confidence
in a univariate setting.
C. Estimation
We test the liquidity risk hypotheses in two different settings. First, we test the overall explana-
tory power of exit channel liquidity to explain the stage distribution of investments in logit models
that predict the likelihood that an investment is made in a specific stage category relative to all
other private equity stages. Since we cannot be sure that there is a strict order of investment stages
across the whole spectrum (e.g., a firm can be in an expansion phase before or after a late stage
VC investment), we estimate individual logit models instead of ordered discrete response mod-
els. For ease of interpretation, stages are estimated individually, but we also discuss unreported
findings of a multinomial regression. In a first set of models, we incorporate time dummies to
capture the aggregate effect of macroeconomic factors on each yearly cross-section. The fit of
these models serves as a benchmark for a second set of models that tests the effects of liquidity
risk and other variables, replacing the time dummies in the first set of regressions. Estimations
employ Huber-White heteroskedasticity-robust (HC3) standard errors, and all our main results
are robust to clustering by year and industry.
Additionally, we treat the financial crisis as a natural experiment on the effect of a market shock
on investment stage choice. We isolate a period of large changes in liquidity during the financial
crisis and test the crisis’ treatment effect on the stage distribution of VC investments. We match
investments before and after the onset of the financial crisis, which we select to be January 1,
2008, and compare the proportion of deals in each stage category. Investments within a two-year
and three-year period after this date are defined as “treated” observations, for which we identify a
matching “control” observation in the three-year period before the event. We match investments
by country, industry, and type of capital received and use propensity score matching on age, deal
size, industry, country, number of investors, and type of capital in each cell so defined. Results
are presented in standard unweighted form and weighted by deal size in order to assess their
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Table II. Summary Statistics by Investment Stage
This table presents descriptive statistics for the main variables by investment stage and compare means, medians, and
proportions between stages for our main independent variables. Stage definitions correspond to those in Table I. For
conciseness, we present the main groups of interest, Seed & Early stage investments, Later Stage andOther Stages, where
Other Stages comprises expansion investments, acquisitions and other private equity investments as defined in Table I.
We compare means using Student’s t-test, medians by employing Fisher’s exact test for testing the null of independence
of rows and columns in a contingency table with fixed marginals (after splitting the combined sample at the median), and
proportions in dummy variables through Pearson’s chi-squared test.
Panel A. Comparisons of Means
Mean Stage Comparisons
Seed & Later Other Seed & Seed & Later
Early Stage Stages Early vs. Late Early vs. Other Stage vs. Other
Age (log) 6.587 8.181 8.185 −57.550∗∗∗ −83.569∗∗∗ −0.148
Deal Size (log) 0.220 0.675 1.205 −9.392∗∗∗ −33.298∗∗∗ −11.354∗∗∗
Investors (log) 0.370 0.434 0.326 −4.500∗∗∗ 6.702∗∗∗ 8.083∗∗∗
IPOs Europe 5.951 5.767 5.911 12.664∗∗∗ 5.203∗∗∗ −10.778∗∗∗
R&D/GDP 1.196 1.211 1.190 −15.349∗∗∗ 11.729∗∗∗ 21.840∗∗∗
VIX 0.218 0.231 0.211 −8.939∗∗∗ 9.449∗∗∗ 14.257∗∗∗
ESI 1.025 0.994 1.021 14.662∗∗∗ 3.864∗∗∗ −13.664∗∗∗
UK Credit Spread 1.295 1.822 1.314 −18.760∗∗∗ −1.659∗ 18.806∗∗∗
UK Gov. Yield 4.773 4.425 4.820 12.994∗∗∗ −3.578∗∗∗ −15.571∗∗∗
Panel B. Comparisons of Medians
Median Stage Comparisons
Seed & Later Other Seed & Seed & Later
Early Stage Stages Early vs. Late Early vs. Other Stage vs. Other
Age (log) 6.780 8.169 8.143 p ≤ 0.000∗∗∗ p ≤ 0.000∗∗∗ p ≤ 0.230
Deal Size (log) 0.349 0.783 1.252 p ≤ 0.000∗∗∗ p ≤ 0.000∗∗∗ p ≤ 0.000∗∗∗
Investors (log) 0.000 0.000 0.000 p ≤ 1.000 p ≤ 1.000 p ≤ 1.000
IPOs Europe 5.900 5.820 5.900 p ≤ 0.000∗∗∗ p ≤ 0.000∗∗∗ p ≤ 0.000∗∗∗
R&D/GDP 1.200 1.220 1.190 p ≤ 0.000∗∗∗ p ≤ 0.000∗∗∗ p ≤ 0.000∗∗∗
VIX 0.233 0.233 0.224 p ≤ 0.141 p ≤ 0.000∗∗∗ p ≤ 0.000∗∗∗
ESI 1.026 1.008 1.026 p ≤ 0.000∗∗∗ p ≤ 0.002∗∗∗ p ≤ 0.000∗∗∗
UK Credit Spread 1.129 1.285 1.129 p ≤ 0.000∗∗∗ p ≤ 0.930 p ≤ 0.000∗∗∗
UK Gov. Yield 4.883 4.503 4.883 p ≤ 0.000∗∗∗ p ≤ 0.000∗∗∗ p ≤ 0.000∗∗∗
Panel C. Comparisons of Proportions
Proportion Stage Comparisons
Seed & Later Other Seed & Seed & Later
Early Stage Stages Early vs. Late Early vs. Other Stage vs. Other
Age n/a 0.312 0.143 0.309 p ≤ 0.000∗∗∗ p ≤ 0.576 p ≤ 0.000∗∗∗
Deal Size n/a 0.398 0.253 0.546 p ≤ 0.000∗∗∗ p ≤ 0.000∗∗∗ p ≤ 0.000∗∗∗
Equity 0.580 0.584 0.417 p ≤ 0.789 p ≤ 0.000∗∗∗ p ≤ 0.000∗∗∗
Debt 0.009 0.145 0.018 p ≤ 0.000∗∗∗ p ≤ 0.000∗∗∗ p ≤ 0.000∗∗∗
Equity & Debt 0.013 0.018 0.020 p ≤ 0.106 p ≤ 0.000∗∗∗ p ≤ 0.660
∗∗∗Significant at the 0.01 level.
∗∗Significant at the 0.05 level.
∗Significant at the 0.10 level.
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Figure 1. Number of Private Equity Investments by Stage
This graph includes 37,831 investments in European targets from 1990 to 2012. Deals involving target firms
in the financial sector have been excluded.
economic significance. The crisis’ effect can then be compared with the effect of the economic
downturn after the dotcom bubble, the date of which we identify with the peak of the NASDAQ
Composite index on March 10, 2000.
Missing values are frequent in our data. Since firm age is not available for about one-third
of our observations, we include a dummy variable to indicate a missing age observation and set
firm age to zero for these cases. We also construct an indicator for missing deal size, which
is not available for about half of all investments. This indicator is the same as our indicator
for missing financing information since this information is missing if, and only if, deal size is
missing.
III. Stage Trends
Comparisons across time indicate a trend toward larger deals, primarily driven by the buyout
sector. The total number of private equity investments has been steadily decreasing prior to the
financial crisis after the postdotcom peak in 2004 (see Figure 1). The financial crisis hit private
equity markets in late 2008, when fundraising activities came to an almost complete halt and
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Figure 2. Volume of Private Equity Investments by Stage
This graph includes 37,831 investments in European targets from 1990 to 2012. Deals involving target firms
in the financial sector have been excluded. Deal sizes are adjusted for inflation and converted into 2010
PPP euros. The lower graph excludes acquisitions and other investments to show the composition of earlier
stages more clearly.
investments were cancelled or deferred. Investments picked up again after the dip in 2009, and
have been in line with the general trend prior to the crisis since then. There was a similar period
of low activity in 2001 and 2002, with the number of investments dropping even stronger. Deal
numbers grew back to precrisis levels within three years both after the dotcom bubble and the
financial crisis. In terms of deal volume, however, recovery took much longer after the dotcom
bubble (see Figure 2). The quick recovery appears to be driven by buyout/acquisition deals, whose
euro volume rose quickly and stabilized on precrisis levels after the immediate liquidity shocks
had subsided in 2010.
This uneven development is particularly striking when comparing the proportion of investments
in each stage category. The proportion of VC investments, including expansion investments, has
remained roughly constant since 2009, as shown in the lower panels of Figure 1. However, the
relative volume of these investments dropped sharply in 2010. This picture is, of course, just the
reverse of the buyout deals’ strong comeback after 2009, but it strongly suggests that the financial
crisis might have affected the private equity market’s subsectors quite differently.
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If we compare yearly stage distributions in the postcrisis and postbubble periods, we find a
strong shift toward later stage and buyout deals.While late stageVCdeals were almost nonexistent
around the year 2000, they now constitute a substantial proportion of private equity investments.
According to Thomson ONE’s definition, late stage deals can be VC investments in established,
yet unprofitable, businesses or the last round before an exit is made through an IPO or trade
sale. Many of them are follow-on investments in existing portfolio companies. EVCA (2013)
data indicate that 55% of all private equity investments in 2010 and 27% in 2012 are follow-on
investments as compared to 44% in 2007. This could indicate that private equity firms lack the
opportunities to sell their portfolio companies after the financial crisis, but surprisingly not in
the postbubble years. Since IPO markets were similarly depressed between 2001 and 2003, we
suspect that other underlying economic reasons are responsible for the observed growth in late
stage VC.
In contrast to the surge in late stage VC deals, we can identify a marked decline in expansion
investments. The proportion of investments aimed at expanding production to increase revenue,
which can be made by both buyout firms and VC firms, was remarkably constant over the past
15 years. The number of such deals began to drop in 2007, followed by a drop in volume in 2010.
Since expansion investments are strongly related to expected demand for the firm’s products, this
decline likely indicates increased uncertainty about future product market conditions.
Interestingly, early stage investments, but not seed investments, show resilience against the
financial crisis and even improve their position as a proportion of all private equity deals. If long-
term growth forecasts were unfavorable, we would expect investors to shy away from sponsoring
early stage transactions. The relative volume of all early stage investments, however, did not
experience similar growth, and seed investments recorded an even sharper negative trend. Seed
and early stage investments are at low levels even compared to the postbubble years 2003 and
2004. The year 2010 saw the smallest proportion of seed/early stage VC deals by volume recorded
over the last 15 years, and the following two years are not much better.
The quick recovery of buyout and acquisition volume supports the argument that private
equity-financed companies (in particular, buyout investments) might be more resilient to crises
because they must respond earlier to an unfavorable economic climate due to their higher debt
burdens (Lerner, 2011). As a consequence, they adjust faster to new conditions and quickly regain
momentum and produce positive returns when the economic environment stabilizes. Even if these
companies face financial distress, it is often less severe than in other companies and can even
lead to increased firm value (Andrade and Kaplan, 1998). Instead, early stage companies that are
financed by equity or mezzanine instruments recover later from crises as the lack of debt on their
balance sheets reduces the likelihood of financial distress and the necessity to react.
IV. Multivariate Analysis
A. Time Effects in a Liquidity Crisis
If the financial crisis can be seen as a liquidity crisis featuring high exit risk for VC investments,
time effects during the crisis should capture its impact on the stage distribution of investments.We
use logit models with year effects to isolate the crisis effect and to give us a benchmark for later
comparisons with models that exclude year dummies in favor of macroeconomic explanatory
variables. The logic is that time dummies are synthetic indicators that capture aggregate effects
produced by variables (possibly unobserved) related to the macroeconomic environment, such as
the number of IPOs or the level of interest rates. If we find that models including time series of
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separate variables achieve a model fit close to that of the benchmark model with time dummies,
we do not need to worry about omitted time effects and can focus on the interpretation of relevant
environmental conditions.
A multivariate analysis controlling for deal characteristics supports the evidence shown in the
descriptive analysis. Table III presents models for individual investment stages and a model for
the early stages combined. As expected in Hypothesis H1, we find a positive time effect on the
likelihood that a private equity investment is made in the early stage of the target’s development.
Liquidity as the hypothesized driving force behind variations in the stage composition is only
partially supported, since we also note a negative effect on seed investment where wewould expect
a positive one. Evenmore surprisingly, the crisis effect on late stage investments is positive instead
of negative, as would be expected if closed exit channels reduced the attractiveness of late stage
VC investments. This finding casts doubt on liquidity risk as the main driver of late stage
investments (Hypothesis H2). The liquidity theory profiled by Cumming et al. (2005) explains
the larger number of early stage deals in periods of narrow exit channels, but would also predict
fewer late stage investments. Conversely, stage drift due to negative market returns can explain the
larger proportion of late stage deals, but not the increase in early stage investments. Both theories,
liquidity and stage drift, have difficulties explaining the series of time effects in Table III. Wald
tests confirm these differences in average coefficients in three-year periods before and during the
financial crisis. As a robustness test, we estimate a multinomial logit model predicting all of the
stages at once. This model confirms the results we find in the individual stage regressions.9
B. Liquidity or Technological Opportunities?
Instead of using time effects to estimate the impact of all changes in the macroeconomic envi-
ronment combined, we can be more specific about potential factors driving the stage distribution
of investments. We include information on the number of IPOs by European (EU27) firms to
directly test the liquidity hypothesis and add the aggregate amount of R&D expenditures by
European businesses, scaled by GDP, as a proxy for technological opportunities. To take into
account the role of other structural determinants of private equity investments, we include in-
dicators for product market sentiment, as well as equity and debt market conditions. Replacing
time dummies with these variables increases the risk of unobserved heterogeneity in the time
dimension and consequent biases. However, the log-likelihood of the models found in Table IV
approaches the log-likelihood of models including time dummies. This makes us confident that
our control variables capture most of the effects that would otherwise be subsumed under time
effects.
Liquidity effects are reflected in the multivariate results of Table IV, but only to a certain
extent. Not only seed and early stage investments, but also late stage VC investments react
negatively to an increasing number of IPOs. If investors choose firms that are close to exit, we
would expect a positive sign for late stage investments as the last investment round before an
IPO.10 We find the same negative coefficient if we reduce the sample to include only early, late
stage, and expansion investments (results not reported here, but available upon request). These
effects are also economically significant. A one standard deviation increase in the (log) number
of European IPOs decreases the proportion of VC investments, seed, early, and late stage deals, by
9 Results are available from the authors. Since single logit models are easier to interpret than multinomial ones due to the
nonfixed reference category, we report only the results for individual logit models. Our interpretation of these results and,
in particular, their standard errors and significance, is consistent with the results from a multinomial regression.
10 This is also the definition adopted by Thomson Reuters.
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7.1 percentage points, as measured by sample average marginal effects.11 The deal class gaining
the most from this reduction in VC investments is expansion investments with a 4.4 percentage
point increase for the same change in liquidity. Thus, liquidity effects confirm the special role of
late stage VC that is apparent in Figures 1 and 2.
Investors do not seem to follow the liquidity logic all the time. At least, it does not appear
to be the main driver of late stage investments. A possible interpretation of this finding is
that an impending IPO makes firms less likely to receive another round of VC. For example,
investors facing adverse exit market conditions could provide further funding for late stage firms
simply to keep them afloat until conditions improve. In his analysis of the staging decisions in
VC, Gompers (1995) argues that firms that go public might quickly turn profitable and would
need less funding instead of more. This argument is supported by the positive coefficient for
expansion investments, which signals an increasing likelihood of these investments in favorable
exit markets. Furthermore, age at investment in the late stage segment decoupled from the cyclical
behavior seen in other VC and expansion investments and has been increasing since the dotcom
period, suggesting structural problems in late stage VC. Under this alternative hypothesis, most
investments in the “later stage” category in a hot issue market would be investments similar to
early stage VC, which operates with a longer time horizon. Exaggerating for the sake of the
argument, late stage investments could even be conceived of as the only investments that are not
made in such a favorable environment.
The effect of technological opportunities on the stage distribution of investments appears to
be strongest at the early stages of development. The effects of aggregate R&D expenditures
are highly significant and economically substantial in our models for early stage and late stage
VC. Investments in both stages react positively to higher R&D spending, while the likelihood
of expansion investments relative to the other stages reacts negatively to increasing R&D ex-
penditures. Interestingly, seed investments can only be weakly explained by macroeconomic
variables, including liquidity and R&D, although the aggregate explanatory power of the other
control variables is relatively high. If we compute and sort the average marginal effects for liq-
uidity and technological opportunities for all of the stages, the implied stage order is {early, late,
seed, acquisition, expansion}for increasing coefficients for liquidity and decreasing coefficients
for technological opportunities. Thus, early stage and expansion stage investment seem to be the
most sensitive to both market conditions.
When we interpret the relative statistical and economic significance of liquidity and techno-
logical opportunities in Table IV in light of Hypotheses H3 and H4, our findings do not support
these predictions. In terms of statistical significance, the effect of liquidity on seed and early
stage investments (t = –9.57 in Column “Seed & Early”) is slightly stronger than the effect
of technological opportunities (t = 8.06). As such, Hypothesis H3 is not supported.12 Equally
surprising, the significance of liquidity (t = –4.97 in Column “Later Stage”) is much weaker for
late stage VC than the effect of technological opportunities (t = 10.53). Average marginal effects
as a measure for the economic significance of our explanatory variables mirror these results.
The average likelihood for seed and early stage investments decreases by 5.3 percentage points
for a one standard deviation change in the (log) number of IPOs, whereas a change of the same
magnitude in R&D expenditures increases the likelihood of seed and early stage investments by
2.8 percentage points. For late stage investments, marginal effects for liquidity and R&D are –2.0
11 Results for average marginal effects are available from the authors.
12 However, use of standard errors clustered by year and industry in place of Huber-White standard errors (t = −7.79
for seed and early investments and t = 5.41 for late stage investments) brings these results more in line with the results
presented in Section IV.C.
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and 2.3 percentage points, respectively. In sum, although liquidity and technological opportunities
appear as strong predictors of the stage distribution of VC, they do not support our predictions
from a liquidity risk viewpoint.
C. Best Predictors of Investment Stage
The strength of an explanatory variable, such as liquidity or technological opportunities, can
also be measured in terms of the variance explained in the dependent variable. Consequently, we
can test Hypotheses H3 and H4 by using a goodness-of-fit index to assess the explanatory power
of both variables. To estimate the power of each macroeconomic indicator in explaining the stage
distribution of investments, we compare the goodness of fit in models including or excluding the
variable in question. Likelihood-ratio tests then give an indication of the relative importance of
these variables. The first set of models presented in Table V compares models that contain only
one macroeconomic control variable at a time. The first three models extend the range of proxies
for liquidity risk by the global number of IPOs and the number of global IPOs that are backed
by private equity funds. The second panel of models is based on the models in Table IV, but
drops one macroeconomic variable at a time. Again, a likelihood-ratio test measures the unique
information contained in each variable.
In this analysis of investment stages, the explanatory power of technological opportunities
dominates that of liquidity risk. For early, late stage, and expansion investments, R&D expendi-
tures rank first or second in explanatory power if added to a model that excludes macroeconomic
variables. They capture much of the environmental conditions that shape the stage distribution
of investments and explain between 28% and 58% of the likelihood difference between models
including and excluding time effects. Among the various IPO variables we consider, the number
of European IPOs performs best in models for VC stages, but contributes much less than R&D
to the model fit. The amount of unique information that is not contained in other macroeco-
nomic variables can be tested by starting from a full model including all of the macroeconomic
controls and dropping one of them at a time. We find that dropping liquidity or technological
opportunities reduces model fit by the same order of magnitude. This suggests that both vari-
ables add unique information to our models, while R&D captures more additional environmental
information.
In summary, we conclude that the empirical evidence partially supports Hypothesis H3 (the
effect of technological opportunities on the likelihood of seed and early stage investments is
stronger than the effect of exit opportunities). Hypothesis H4 (the effect of technological oppor-
tunities on the likelihood of late stage investments is weaker than the effect of exit opportunities)
cannot be supported since technological opportunities improve model fit substantially more than
liquidity. Even for expansion investments, which can be understood as investments in firms at
a late stage of their development, technological opportunities outperform liquidity in terms of
explanatory power.
Interestingly, a strong effect of liquidity does appear in acquisition investments, which are
omitted in the study by Cumming et al. (2005). It is the number of private equity-backed IPOs
however, and not the total number of IPOs, that explains the prevalence of these investments
in some time periods. Additionally, their sensitivity to these international IPOs, as opposed to
European IPOs, suggests that later stages react more strongly to global market conditions. The
variable that carries the most unique information about acquisitions and expansions is the yield
spread between corporate and government bonds. This measure can be seen as an indicator for
risk in the credit market, upon which firms rely during the expansion and acquisition stages.
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Figure 3. Time Effects in Multivariate Regressions of Firm Stage
This graph illustrates the time effects from regressions presented in Table III relative to the base year 1990.
Vertical lines indicate the approximate end of boom periods.
V. The Stage Distribution after the Financial Crisis
What are the implications of the financial crisis for the VC investment model in Europe?
During the crisis years of 2008 and 2009, several authors drew a gloomy picture for the future
of the VC industry not only because of the dramatic changes in the macroeconomic framework,
but also because of the weak returns recorded over the whole 2000-2010 period (Kedrosky, 2009;
Mason, 2009; Lerner, 2011). In combination with large past inflows of capital, the tightening
of exit channels creates a bottleneck in the VC cycle. Where capital is supposed to be invested,
disinvested, distributed to limited partners, and then re-committed to new funds, resources are
stuck in the investment phase of the cycle (Mason, 2009). The difficulty to produce cash flows
from exits is aggravated by increasing IPO deal sizes, which are necessary to yield reasonable
profits in the face of high transaction costs, and casts doubt on the VC business model.
A comparison between the dotcom period and the recent financial crisis can be useful when
generating further insight into the reaction of VC markets to changes in the macroeconomic
framework. The time effects in our regressions of investment stages demonstrate striking differ-
ences between the two shocks. Figure 3 presents a summary of the effects obtained in Table III.
We find strong and highly significant negative time effects on expansion financing during the
financial crisis, but positive ones for late stage investments. The opposite picture emerges during
the dotcom period, which shows growth in expansion investments and a small decline in late
stage investments. Interestingly, and similar to the univariate case, we find a positive time effect
on early stage investments in recent years, but a negative effect on seed investments, while none
of these effects can be detected during the dotcom period. The same picture emerges if we use
models including environmental indicators (Table IV) plus a time dummy for the years 2010 and
2011. This time dummy yields estimates of the most recent time trend, which are consistent with
an abnormal increase in late stage financings, more early stage investments, but fewer expansion
and seed stage deals.
If investments in core VC stages (seed, early, and later stage) are grouped together, they perform
above par after 2007. This is an important finding. The economic crisis does not appear to have
had a negative effect on the likelihood of VC financing that is not already explained by deal-
specific variables and macroeconomic indicators. In other words, the perceived lack of early
314 Financial Management  Summer 2014
stage financing cannot be attributed to the financial crisis, but seems to be endogenous to the
evolutionary development of the private equity market and might be a structural problem of
the VC investment landscape. Note, however, that seed investments show an unstable negative
coefficient, which might be a cause for concern. Moreover, the increasing proportion of late stage
deals can be interpreted not as investors anticipating profitable exit opportunities, but as struggling
start-ups in need of cash to ride out adverse product market conditions until profitability and exit
channels improve.
Analyses using individual investments as their basic unit can reveal only part of the economic
significance of recent trends. From a policy perspective, it is important to understand whether the
next euro invested in private equity will be an early stage euro. Since the volume of capital flows
may be more relevant for economic development than the number of investments, we perform a
similar set of regressions of firm stage as in Table III, but weighted by deal size.
Results from the weighted regressions are presented in Table VI. Comparisons of time effects
for the 2004-2007 and 2008-2011 periods confirm the positive effect of the crisis on early stage
and late stage investments found in the unweighted analyses. The negative effect on expansion
investments is, however, insignificant. These effects on early stage and late stage investments
cannot be observed during the dotcom period. More investment in VC deals could mean that
the VC business model is not broken and that good investments can still be made. However,
the financial crisis may have made it harder for portfolio firms to achieve profitability before
being sold in IPOs or trade sales, thus requiring more late stage money to survive the worst years.
Reduced expansion investment similarly points toward a lack of demand and growth opportunities.
Regressions using time dummies to identify changes over time might still suffer from changes
in unobserved variables that determine the stage focus of investments. A robustness test can be
performed by matching postevent investments to similar investments in a short period prior to
the financial crisis and comparing the stage distribution within these matched pairs. Therefore,
we concentrate on two-year windows during the financial crisis and the dotcom bubble in order
to limit the effect of unobserved heterogeneity over time.
Matching pre- and postcrisis investments confirms the earlier results presented in Table VI.
We find more early and late stage financing in 2008 and 2009 as compared to the preceding
two-year period, but fewer seed and expansion investments (see Table VII). When compared to
the dotcom period, there is a strong increase in the number of early and late stage financing,
in line with our earlier results (see Table VI). There is also evidence of an exceptionally weak
climate for expansion investments during the financial crisis, a result that is found again in the
low proportion of expansion investments weighted by deal size, reflecting worsening prospects
for the growth of new firms after the financial crisis. In contrast to the dotcom bust period, seed
and early stage investment did not suffer a setback. This result again indicates the limited impact
of the financial crisis on the market for start-up capital.
VI. Robustness Checks and Extensions: The Role of Country
Effects
Since macroeconomic time series tend to be correlated to a high degree, we test several
alternative specifications to estimate the impact of collinearity among the explanatory variables
used in the main estimations. Table IV (Panel B) presents specifications that include only IPOs
and R&D expenditures either at the same time or individually, without other macroeconomic
control variables. In both cases, the results are consistent with richer specifications. Including
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additional control variables renders coefficients on IPOs and R&D for the seed stage insignificant
and more plausible. Additionally, the stage order implied by the marginal effects does not change.
A second robustness check is called for by the observation that government programs tend
to invest in seed and early stage firms, which may bias our results if government responses to
liquidity or technology shocks are different from that of other investors. As La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) note, civil law countries often rely more heavily on a state supply
of financing and state investment companies to promote economic growth than common law
countries. Thus, we repeat our regressions excluding 1,217 transactions that mention government
affiliated programs as investors. All our main findings remain unchanged. Two small, but notable
changes appear at the seed stage. We find a smaller effect of liquidity, which is now insignificant
(previously significant at the 10% level) and a larger, but still insignificant effect (0.902) of
technological opportunities.
Finally, the effects of liquidity and technological opportunities on the stage distribution of VC
and private equity investments may be moderated by local institutions and legal frameworks.
The effects of these factors may not be accurately captured by country dummies. Therefore, it
is important to extend our analysis and take them into account in order to test the robustness
of our results and uncover the presence of additional cross-country effects. Prior studies have
found that legal frameworks affect capital markets’ activities and economic growth (Levine,
1998, 2005). More specifically, corporate governance regimes can influence the cost of capital,
firm performance, and the distribution of wealth between different stakeholders (La Porta et al.,
2000, 2008; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003). The cost of going public varies across countries
and tends to be lower among countries with stronger legal frameworks (Shleifer and Wolfenzon
2002; Cumming, Fleming, and Schwienbacher, 2006). In addition, in private equity markets, VC
control rights increase the likelihood that an entrepreneurial firmwill exit by an acquisition, rather
than through an IPO (Cumming, 2008), which suggests a differential impact of legal factors on
VC investments and acquisitions. Investors employ fewer of these controls and veto rights and
use common equity in countries of German legal origin, relative to Socialist, Scandinavian, and
French legal origin (Cumming and Johan, 2008).
These economic effects of legal environments suggest a varying stage distribution of private
equity investments across countries and potential interactions with other macroeconomic indi-
cators such as liquidity in IPO markets. Countries with more developed capital markets usually
have more IPOs, but efficient capital markets might also help investors to respond more quickly
to fluctuations in liquidity. Similarly, differences in the government regulation of product or labor
markets (e.g., the greater contractual flexibility of common law countries as in La Porta et al.,
2008) can affect investors’ ability to expand or contract R&D expenditures in response to the
availability of profitable investments in technology. Additionally, investors may simply be more
sensitive to technological developments in countries with high R&D activity.13 While the cross-
sectional effects (i.e., main effects) of legal factors on the stage distribution of VC investments
are captured by country dummies in our regressions, there is the potential for interaction effects
that might not be captured in our model thus far.
Ideally, we would like to directly test for moderation effects through interaction terms that
contain legal factors, such as anti-director rights, minority shareholder protection, or creditor
rights (La Porta et al., 1998; Martynova and Renneboog, 2010) and liquidity or R&D. These
interaction terms are highly correlated, however, with our time series for aggregate IPOs and
R&D. Therefore, we classify countries according to legal origin and interact themwith the number
13 Time averages of R&D/GDP for our sample period are 1.16% for countries of English legal origin, 0.93% for French
legal origin, 1.54% for German legal origin, and 1.79% for Scandinavian countries.
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of IPOs and R&D expenditures. We report the results for the models that include interaction terms
for the two most important stage classes in the context of this paper: seed and early stage VC and
late stage VC.
Regressions for separate groups of countries reveal a number of differences in their sensitivity
to IPOmarket conditions and R&D expenditures. The results in Table VIII suggest that seed, early,
and late stage VC investors react most strongly to liquidity signals in countries with English legal
origin. The proportion of these investments decreases less when liquidity improves in countries
with legal systems of French, German, or Scandinavian origin (Columns “Interaction Terms”).
This may be the reason why studies of the stage distribution of VC investments in the United
States have found strong liquidity effects.
A reverse picture emerges for technological opportunities. Seed, early, and late stage investments
in common law countries are least sensitive to changes in R&D expenditures across model
specifications. There is no clear ranking, however, among French, German, and Scandinavian
countries. For seed and early stage investment, the largest effects can be found in countries of
German legal origin, while R&D effects on late stage VC are greatest for countries of French
and Scandinavian legal origin. The strong common effect for liquidity and diverse effects for
R&D suggest that the availability of technological developments might be more localized than
exit channels for private equity investments.14
These results touch upon the important question whether investors react to local environmental
conditions or respond, instead, to global signals. Although we cannot fully address this problem
within the constraints of this paper, we find some evidence against the hypothesis of segmented
markets. We test the segmentation hypothesis by measuring business R&D expenditures and IPOs
in each group of countries. The results are presented in Table VIII, in the columns labeled “local
group.” Liquidity loses its significance if data at the group level are used instead of the total
number of European IPOs. R&D remains significant for seed and early stage investments, but
loses economic significance for all VC investments. If we include aggregate European R&D and
liquidity alongside local time series (Columns “Incl. Aggregates”), most of the economic and
statistical significance is attributed to the aggregate variable, not the local one.15 These results
support our choice of aggregate independent variables. More fine grained observations of legal
variables could be used in future research and may reveal sharper contrasts across countries or
different levels of sensitivity to global and local factors.
VII. Conclusion
This study addresses the theoretical problems of the role of exits in VC contracting (Black
and Gilson, 1998; Aghion et al., 2004) and the determinants of the stage distribution of private
equity investments (Gompers, 1995; Cumming et al., 2005, 2009). Its empirical contribution is an
original analysis of the long-term development of European VC investments and their reaction to
14 We also examine the effects of legal origin by running separate regressions for each group of countries. The results,
which are available upon request from the authors, are similar, but less precise due to estimation uncertainty related
to smaller sample sizes. This favors the choice of the combined regression approach based on the interaction effects
presented in Table VIII.
15 Further results (not reported here, but available upon request) indicate two distinct effects on VC investments: 1) a
strong common effect of aggregate R&D and 2) a cross-sectional R&D effect that comes into force if country dummies
are omitted from the regression. R&D itself is only weakly significant in most of the regressions, but if we decompose it
into aggregate European R&D and an orthogonal residual component per country and year, both are highly significant if
country dummies are excluded.
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the post-2007 financial crisis, with a counterfactual analysis of the dotcom boom and bust period.
We investigate how investors’ choices of early versus late stage investments vary with the broader
macroeconomic framework and identify drivers of the stage composition. Investment decisions
are sensitive to liquidity risk and the availability of technological opportunities, but the effect of
these factors varies across investment stages. Consistent with the liquidity risk theory, our results
indicate that liquidity risk increases the probability of investing in earlier stages relative to all
private equity investments. However, liquid exit markets also increase the proportion of late stage
VC investments.
Liquidity risk alone is insufficient to explain the increased likelihood of late stage investments
in recent years, and IPO market indicators can only partially predict the stage of investments.
Overall, technological opportunities are a better explanatory variable than liquidity. We examine
their effect in models that explicitly consider controls for the broader macroeconomic framework
in which investments take place, including indicators for credit market risk, which are significant
predictors of expansion and acquisition investments. These variables are often omitted in the prior
research on investment staging. While liquidity, combined with credit risk, is the main driver of
acquisition investments and, to some extent, of expansion financing, technological opportunities
are by far the most powerful explanation of earlier stage investment choices.
With specific reference to the effects of the financial crisis, we find that VC funds invested at
least as actively as other private equity funds, but caution against an optimistic interpretation of
this finding. The trend of a decreasing number of VC investments after the dotcom boom reversed
for early and late stage investments during the recent crisis. In these stages, the crisis does not
appear to have had a negative effect on the likelihood of VC financing. However, we find strong
and highly significant negative time effects on expansion financing during the financial crisis.
Combined with the interpretation that late stage investments are made to keep firms afloat until
exit markets become liquid, fewer expansion investments indicate an environment characterized
by adverse demand conditions in firms’ product markets.16
Despite extensive robustness checks, the paper has, of course, limitations and these indicate
potential avenues for further research. Above all, we focus on investments as choices that imply
valuations of expected returns, but we have not directly addressed the question of performance and
its relation to the stage distribution and macroeconomic events. This question could be addressed
at the fund or investment level. This analysis would also be able to address the role of different
types of funds, and the relation between fund performance and local legal frameworks (Nahata,
2008; Cumming and Walz, 2010). A second and related question concerns fundraising and the
long-term sustainability of the VC model (Mason, 2009; Lerner, 2011). Analyses of fundraising
during the current recovery period and analyses of returns from funds invested during the financial
crisis years will be especially important from a policy and a financial management perspective.
Overall, the outlook for European VC from an investor’s viewpoint suggests disappointing
growth rates with low, although increasingly stable, levels of investment volume.17 There might,
however, be hope for the sector from a performance perspective. The pooled one-year internal
rate of return of VC funds in Europe broke even in 2010 and increased to 9.9% in 2012.
16 In line with Cumming, Schmidt, and Walz (2010), it would be interesting to consider, through an extension of this
analytical framework, whether there are differences between crisis and noncrisis periods, and between early and late
stages, in the time it takes to make an investment. This could be addressed in follow-up studies.
17 Contrary to slowly growing late stage VC and buyout private equity, VC fundraising dropped to EUR 3.1 billion in
2011 according to Thomson ONE fundraising data and is stabilizing at this level, which was last seen in 2003. Uninvested
capital, as a percentage of total capital committed to VC funds in Europe, has been decreasing constantly since the peak
year 2000 and was at the lowest level on record at 24% in 2012. Not once over the past 20 years has uninvested capital
dropped below 35%, but has usually fluctuated around the 40% mark.
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Despite the difficult macroeconomic outlook, the VC model may be sound, as argued for the
United States by Kaplan and Lerner (2010). Funds only need to keep on doing what they have
always done; that is, connect entrepreneurs with good ideas, screen investments, design effective
incentive schemes, and help companies through monitoring and guidance. Slow fundraising,
but increasingly good returns could pave the way for a stable, albeit smaller, VC industry in
Europe.
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